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1 Who knoWs a utility 
representation
Repeatedly it is alleged that this or that 
theory concerns a decision maker maxi-
mizing some utility function. But, as I 
have been at pains to discuss, the repre-
sentation is not a creature of the deci-
sion maker but of the scientist studying 
the decision maker’s behavior “The 
representation theorems go in only one 
direction: from behavioral and structural 
properties to numerical representations. 
The behavioral properties embody the 
scientific information that we, as scien-
tists, have about the decision maker. It 
is the scientist, not the decision maker, 
who formulates both the properties (axi-
oms) and the representation. The decision 
maker exhibits the behavior which, pre-
sumably, arises from some fairly complex 
neuronal processes…” (Luce, 2000, p. 25). 
This observation holds far more broadly 
than just in decision making.
2 uniqueness of the 
representation
Uniqueness of representations is, of 
course, a very well trodden topic. The 
gist is that in addition to proving a rep-
resentation theorem, one must also for-
mulate a uniqueness theorem – how do 
the several representations relate? In most 
of the popular measurement theories, the 
uniqueness falls into one of Stevens’ (1946, 
1951) well known classification: nominal, 
ordinal, interval, log-interval, ratio, and 
absolute scales (see Krantz et al., 1971; 
Luce et al., 1990).
As I recently came to realize, when we 
are dealing with a preference weak order ≥ 
and a binary operation ⊕, such as the con-
catenation of two sums of money, for which 
0 money is an identity of ⊕ and ⊕ is com-
mutative, associative, and monotonic in ≥, 
things are not really quite as simple as has 
been long believed.
Recall that Hölder (1901) proved in 
this context the existence of an additive 
representation
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which is unique up to a ratio scale.
A century later it was recognized that, in 
the context of utility theory, we also have 
the interplay between value and risk, which 
means that multiplication as well as addition 
is in play. See, e.g., (3) below. So the mapping 
should be into 〈R, ≥, +, ×〉, in which case the 
full set of polynomial (p-additive) represen-
tations are (see Luce, 2000, p.151, § 4.4.6)
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Of course, d = 0 is Hölder’s original 
solution. The other two are quite different 
in that they are absolute scales (see Luce, 
2010a). Here is the reason: when d ≠ 0, (2) is 
equivalent to
11 1 += + ( ) + ( ). dc dc dc () () () xy xy ⊕
But this expression is not invariant under 
any transformation of c other than the 
identity. The fact they are absolute scales 
has several important implications.
3 some implications of the 
p-additive representation
3.1 three types of people
There are three inherently different types of 
people corresponding to their values of d. 
The following simple behavioral criterion 
to decide a particular person’s type was 
reported by Luce (2010a).
Let (x, p; y, 1 − p) denote the gamble 
where x occurs with probability p and y with 
probability 1 − p and suppose, as is true in a 
great many theories of utility, that
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where ψ has been replaced in this context by 
U for utility, W is a strictly increasing sub-
jective probability function, and W(0) = 0. 
Further, assume that
Wp Wp () () +− =. 11  
(4)
Find the probability p1/2 with subjective 
probability 1/2, i.e., such that for the repre-
sentation (3) and for all x > y
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I assume that W(p) = p is satisfied for 
p = 0, p = p1/2, possibly for p = 1, but not 
elsewhere. Note that it follows that relative 
to the line f(p) = p, the weighting func-
tion W must be either S-shaped or inverse 
S-shaped. See Section 3.4 of Luce (2000) 
for a summary of empirical estimates which 
seem to agree with this prediction.
Then the criterion for d is that for all 
x > x′ > y > y′
d =
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Observe that under the ordering con-
straint on the consequences, the gamble 
on the left has a greater variance than the 
one on the right. For that reason, the three 
d types are called, respectively, risk-seeking 
(d = 1), risk-neutral (d = 0), and risk-averse 
(d = −1). It would not surprise me that in 
the academic population, which is the 
source of many experimental respondents, 
risk-averse types will predominate except, 
perhaps, in schools of business.
It has yet to be shown empirically that 
this classification holds up in the population. 
But should it, one simply should not aver-
age data over people without, at the least, 
dealing with the three classes separately. 
Indeed, really only the d = 0 types should 
ever be averaged. Individual  differences are 
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non-negative real numbers (Luce, under 
review). Indeed, the only exceptions that I 
know of involve what can be called binary 
senses that involve the close interaction of 
the two ears and of the two eyes. The binary 
theory coupled with certain loudness and 
brightness data simply rule out the two 
d ≠ 0 cases.
Thus, when we ask a respondent to 
match subjective intensities of one modality 
to those of another modality, then, because 
of the three values of d arise for all but the 
binary attributes, we get a complex of pre-
dicted results (Luce, under review, Table 1). 
This fact suggests an extensive experimental 
program to be done.
4 closing remarks
I have made a strong claim here, namely, 
that a slight mathematical oversight – map-
ping just into addition when, for other 
theoretical reasons, multiplication is also 
involved – has put us on a misguided course 
for over a century. And that course may, in 
a number of ways, have been scientifically 
misleading.
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important. This has significant implications 
– e.g., many behavioral economic experi-
ments should be redone taking into account 
individual types (Luce, 2010b).
3.2 utility forms of risk types
Three forms of utility follow from (2) and 
(6): there exist positive constants a, k, and 
l such that
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(Luce, 2010a). Note that for d  = 1, this 
function is bounded from below by −1 and 
unbounded from above, whereas for d = −1 
it is unbounded from below and bounded 
by 1 from above.
3.3 interpersonal comparisons of utility
Because the d ≠ 0 scales are absolute, inter-
personal comparisons become meaningful, 
although for a mix of −1 and 1 types, only in 
the common interval (−1,1) (Luce, 2010a). 
No such comparisons can be made involv-
ing risk-neutral types of people. If correct, 
this makes sense of the fact that classical 
utility theorists have found interpersonal 
comparisons impossible (e.g., Robbins, 
1938; Harsanyi, 1977; Elster and Roemer, 
1991; Hammond, 1991; Binmore, 2009) 
although most of us intuit that we regu-
larly make such comparisons. And just how 
many of us are risk-neutral?
3.4 psychophysical scaling in general
As I have thought more about subjective 
intensity scales, I have come to realize that 
many other attributes of subjective intensity 
closely resemble the utility theory of risk 
except that most are defined only on the 
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